FROM VARANGIANS TO LOCALS
How Moscow controls regional politics
A political power vertical has developed in Russia over the course of Vladimir Putin’s rule. Regional politicians and government officials are subjugated to the Kremlin. They are thus unable to make decisions themselves and grow the regions based on their residents’ needs rather than those of the authorities. Independent Russian news website 7x7 teamed with Memorial's experts to examine how political dependence has solidified over the years and the danger it poses to the regions, taking the Yaroslavl Region as an example.
Yevgeny Urlashov and the opposition: how the Kremlin removes rebels
January 29, 2024
DISCLAIMER:
This article has been published as part of 30 Years Before, a project by Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre. The views of its authors and editors do not necessarily reflect the views of Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, and vice versa.
This article has been published as part of 30 Years Before, a project by Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre. The views of its authors and editors do not necessarily reflect the views of Memorial Human Rights Defence Centre, and vice versa.
At the same time that it built a hierarchical dependence of regional heads on Moscow, the Kremlin also created tools for removing undesirable officials and politicians through security agencies and legislative resources.
Urlashov’s policies were at odds with the political vertical’s usual way of doing things. Urlashov paid particular attention to Yaroslavl’s appearance while he led the city. He also expressed a desire to run in regional elections. Considering his rating, the authorities likely feared that his campaign would be successful. Regional government was traditionally considered a step on the ladder towards a career in the federal government.
On 3 July 2013, Urlashov was detained by local economic security police. They suspected him of having extorted a bribe of 14 million rubles. Urlashov would be found guilty three years later and sentenced to twelve and a half years in a maximum-security penal colony and fined 60 million rubles.
Urlashov's arrest sparked off a new wave of protests in Yaroslavl: around three thousand people attended the first protest rallies. That is an impressive number for a city with a population of almost 600,000.
Meanwhile, state TV channels ran broadcasts of police footage showing Urlashov allegedly accepting a bribe. According to Krasulin, the authorities did everything they could to convince people that he was guilty. The opposition mayor’s image was tarnished: he must be guilty if he was detained, people were led to think. The campaign in Urlashov’s defence was much less vigorous than the later grassroots defence of Khabarovsk Territory Governor Sergei Furgal.
In 2013, the arrest of a city’s mayor was a milestone, but was no longer unique. In 2010, Mikhail Lysenko, the mayor of Engels (a city in the Saratov Region) was arrested on charges of contract murder, organising a criminal gang and financial fraud. A jury found him guilty of bribetaking and sentenced him to seven and a half years in a maximum-security penal colony.
These are just a few examples. The authorities would later also deploy their repressive machinery against undesirable governors. The most vivid example is the case against Sergei Furgal.
The Black Earth region political analyst says that even the Kremlin’s well-oiled system can malfunction and sometimes the governorship may go to the “wrong” person. That’s what happened in the case of Furgal.
In 2018, the system suffered a major breakdown over the pension reforms. It landed Sergei Furgal in prison. In another case, Liberal Democratic Party candidate Vladimir Sipyagin, who won the governor’s elections in the second round over the incumbent head of the Vladimir Region and United Russia party member Svetlana Orlova, resigned as head of the region. He chose to become a deputy in the federal parliament instead. The election results in the Maritime Territory (Primorsky Krai) were overturned after Communist Andrey Ishchenko won in the second round. A new vote was held in December with a different slate of candidates, and Oleg Kozhemyako was elected governor. He had run for election as an independent candidate, but in 2019 was appointed secretary of the United Russia party branch.
The recent 2023 gubernatorial elections in the Republic of Khakassia also showed that the system can still malfunction: incumbent Communist governor Valentin Konovalov won that race.
Urlashov’s policies were at odds with the political vertical’s usual way of doing things. Urlashov paid particular attention to Yaroslavl’s appearance while he led the city. He also expressed a desire to run in regional elections. Considering his rating, the authorities likely feared that his campaign would be successful. Regional government was traditionally considered a step on the ladder towards a career in the federal government.
On 3 July 2013, Urlashov was detained by local economic security police. They suspected him of having extorted a bribe of 14 million rubles. Urlashov would be found guilty three years later and sentenced to twelve and a half years in a maximum-security penal colony and fined 60 million rubles.
Urlashov's arrest sparked off a new wave of protests in Yaroslavl: around three thousand people attended the first protest rallies. That is an impressive number for a city with a population of almost 600,000.
Meanwhile, state TV channels ran broadcasts of police footage showing Urlashov allegedly accepting a bribe. According to Krasulin, the authorities did everything they could to convince people that he was guilty. The opposition mayor’s image was tarnished: he must be guilty if he was detained, people were led to think. The campaign in Urlashov’s defence was much less vigorous than the later grassroots defence of Khabarovsk Territory Governor Sergei Furgal.
In 2013, the arrest of a city’s mayor was a milestone, but was no longer unique. In 2010, Mikhail Lysenko, the mayor of Engels (a city in the Saratov Region) was arrested on charges of contract murder, organising a criminal gang and financial fraud. A jury found him guilty of bribetaking and sentenced him to seven and a half years in a maximum-security penal colony.
These are just a few examples. The authorities would later also deploy their repressive machinery against undesirable governors. The most vivid example is the case against Sergei Furgal.
The Black Earth region political analyst says that even the Kremlin’s well-oiled system can malfunction and sometimes the governorship may go to the “wrong” person. That’s what happened in the case of Furgal.
In 2018, the system suffered a major breakdown over the pension reforms. It landed Sergei Furgal in prison. In another case, Liberal Democratic Party candidate Vladimir Sipyagin, who won the governor’s elections in the second round over the incumbent head of the Vladimir Region and United Russia party member Svetlana Orlova, resigned as head of the region. He chose to become a deputy in the federal parliament instead. The election results in the Maritime Territory (Primorsky Krai) were overturned after Communist Andrey Ishchenko won in the second round. A new vote was held in December with a different slate of candidates, and Oleg Kozhemyako was elected governor. He had run for election as an independent candidate, but in 2019 was appointed secretary of the United Russia party branch.
The recent 2023 gubernatorial elections in the Republic of Khakassia also showed that the system can still malfunction: incumbent Communist governor Valentin Konovalov won that race.
On 7 September 2011, a Yak-42D airliner crashed in Yaroslavl during take-off. Besides the crew, on board was the Lokomotiv Yaroslavl hockey team. The club had been scheduled to play against Belarusian team Dinamo in Minsk. According to open-source data, at an altitude of five metres the plane’s wing hit the building housing a radio transmitter. The pilots were unable to land the plane. Part of the plane was found 900 metres from the airport, while another part was discovered in the Tunoshna River. Of the 45 people on board, only one person survived. The Interstate Aviation Committee reported following its investigations that crew error had caused the crash.
Not everyone agreed with the official account. Local politician Yevgeny Urlashov even resigned from the United Russia party after the accident. He claimed that one of the possible reasons for the crash was the Yaroslavl Political Forum, which was held in Yaroslavl on 7-8 September 2011 and hosted the country’s top leaders. It was because of the forum that the Yak-42D liner’s crew had rushed to take off. The plane needed to free up the runway as soon as possible for attendees flying in to the forum.
Yaroslavl political consultant Mikhail Krasulin believes that that was precisely when ordinary residents of Yaroslavl gained further impetus for their opposition sentiments. “Then, in December 2011, a Russia-wide wave of opposition kicked off in many Russian cities. But in Yaroslavl it also coincided with the local tragedy which residents also connected with the authorities’ actions.”
Yevgeny Urlashov, born and raised in Yaroslavl, was an aide to a regional legislator in the early noughties. Later he became a municipal councillor himself. In late 2011 he decided to run for mayor of Yaroslavl. He won the race in the second round, beating the United Russia candidate.
The power vertical that had started to take shape in Russia since Vladimir Putin had assumed the presidency had already cemented itself by that time. A political analyst from the Black Earth region, who agreed to speak with 7х7 on condition of anonymity, said that at first the centralisation process seemed moderate. It also fit into the concept of restoring the government’s capabilities after the systemic crisis of the 1990s. But it was by the mid-noughties that those processes took on the features of what we call the power vertical—in other words, when regional leaders are essentially arranged in a hierarchical system as if they were federal officials.
Stanislav Andreichuk, co-chair of the Golos movement adds, “The power vertical process went in waves, but it had to reach the bottom at a certain point. First the authorities fought the regional opposition, then they took on the local opposition. The noughties of course were marked by the attempt to rein in regional government. So, abolishing gubernatorial elections was a key point in this.”
Russia abolished direct elections of regional governors in 2004. The regions came to be controlled from the Kremlin. So, the only way to resist the Moscow authorities was to unite at the local level. That’s what Urlashov succeeded in doing in 2012; other candidates managed it in various Russian cities over the next decade.
Like some other Russian cities, Yaroslavl had a strong Communist Party branch. Political consultant Mikhail Krasulin claims that the Communist Party’s popularity was due less to people’s liking communist ideas and more to former regional party leaders (Alexander Vorobyev, who had led the Yaroslavl branch of the Communist Party for many years, died in 2021) and to the fact that it used to oppose United Russia.
“[Opposition leader Alexei] Navalny’s call in February 2011 to ‘Vote for any party but the party of crooks and thieves’ aligned well with how the Communist Party was positioning itself in the run-up to the elections. People who didn’t want to see United Russia party members in power started to vote for the Communists as well simply because the Communist Party was not United Russia. The ruling party then received the lowest number of votes in the country, 29%, in the Yaroslavl Region. Later, when local politicians—communists, liberals and democrats—needed to unite against the United Russia party members, they did so on a non-ideological basis,” Krasulin said.
Stanislav Andreichuk also argues that one shouldn’t focus on party brands when analysing regional politics.
“Regional politics is more complex in that sense. That’s because the most unexpected people can run in the regions for parties such as A Just Russia, the Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and others. It’s not just black-and-white politics with good and bad guys. Most of these guys are lacklustre. They have their own influence and interest groups, so even now they continue to compete with each other.”
After the 2012 protests on Bolotnaya Square, the authorities decided to make concessions and bow to democracy. Direct elections for governors made a comeback, but in a special form. The Black Earth region political analyst says that the current gubernatorial elections can best be termed “voting organised to approve the Kremlin’s candidate.”
Not everyone agreed with the official account. Local politician Yevgeny Urlashov even resigned from the United Russia party after the accident. He claimed that one of the possible reasons for the crash was the Yaroslavl Political Forum, which was held in Yaroslavl on 7-8 September 2011 and hosted the country’s top leaders. It was because of the forum that the Yak-42D liner’s crew had rushed to take off. The plane needed to free up the runway as soon as possible for attendees flying in to the forum.
Yaroslavl political consultant Mikhail Krasulin believes that that was precisely when ordinary residents of Yaroslavl gained further impetus for their opposition sentiments. “Then, in December 2011, a Russia-wide wave of opposition kicked off in many Russian cities. But in Yaroslavl it also coincided with the local tragedy which residents also connected with the authorities’ actions.”
Yevgeny Urlashov, born and raised in Yaroslavl, was an aide to a regional legislator in the early noughties. Later he became a municipal councillor himself. In late 2011 he decided to run for mayor of Yaroslavl. He won the race in the second round, beating the United Russia candidate.
The power vertical that had started to take shape in Russia since Vladimir Putin had assumed the presidency had already cemented itself by that time. A political analyst from the Black Earth region, who agreed to speak with 7х7 on condition of anonymity, said that at first the centralisation process seemed moderate. It also fit into the concept of restoring the government’s capabilities after the systemic crisis of the 1990s. But it was by the mid-noughties that those processes took on the features of what we call the power vertical—in other words, when regional leaders are essentially arranged in a hierarchical system as if they were federal officials.
Stanislav Andreichuk, co-chair of the Golos movement adds, “The power vertical process went in waves, but it had to reach the bottom at a certain point. First the authorities fought the regional opposition, then they took on the local opposition. The noughties of course were marked by the attempt to rein in regional government. So, abolishing gubernatorial elections was a key point in this.”
Russia abolished direct elections of regional governors in 2004. The regions came to be controlled from the Kremlin. So, the only way to resist the Moscow authorities was to unite at the local level. That’s what Urlashov succeeded in doing in 2012; other candidates managed it in various Russian cities over the next decade.
Like some other Russian cities, Yaroslavl had a strong Communist Party branch. Political consultant Mikhail Krasulin claims that the Communist Party’s popularity was due less to people’s liking communist ideas and more to former regional party leaders (Alexander Vorobyev, who had led the Yaroslavl branch of the Communist Party for many years, died in 2021) and to the fact that it used to oppose United Russia.
“[Opposition leader Alexei] Navalny’s call in February 2011 to ‘Vote for any party but the party of crooks and thieves’ aligned well with how the Communist Party was positioning itself in the run-up to the elections. People who didn’t want to see United Russia party members in power started to vote for the Communists as well simply because the Communist Party was not United Russia. The ruling party then received the lowest number of votes in the country, 29%, in the Yaroslavl Region. Later, when local politicians—communists, liberals and democrats—needed to unite against the United Russia party members, they did so on a non-ideological basis,” Krasulin said.
Stanislav Andreichuk also argues that one shouldn’t focus on party brands when analysing regional politics.
“Regional politics is more complex in that sense. That’s because the most unexpected people can run in the regions for parties such as A Just Russia, the Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and others. It’s not just black-and-white politics with good and bad guys. Most of these guys are lacklustre. They have their own influence and interest groups, so even now they continue to compete with each other.”
After the 2012 protests on Bolotnaya Square, the authorities decided to make concessions and bow to democracy. Direct elections for governors made a comeback, but in a special form. The Black Earth region political analyst says that the current gubernatorial elections can best be termed “voting organised to approve the Kremlin’s candidate.”
The Kremlin quickly got its bearings. On the one hand, it invented a filter that didn’t allow unapproved candidates to come to power. In other words, like it or not, the Kremlin’s person would become governor. On the other hand, by reinstating direct elections of governors, the Kremlin made the corps of governors legitimate: elections will always be considered a better option than directly appointing a governor in the region’s duma [parliament], as happened before 2012.
“Konovalov is too good to be true because he won an election that he was totally designed to lose. Huge resources were spent on promoting the other candidate, but it didn’t work.”
In 1850, Ivan Aksakov, a government official, came to Yaroslavl province to study the local population’s religious identity. His trip resulted in notes asserting that 50 percent of the population were secretly sectarians (schismatics). In other words, people were still so-called Old Believers even though they attended a Russian Orthodox church.
This episode is typical of the Yaroslavl Region. That’s because the region has a history of opposition. The region saw one of the biggest revolts against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War, and in 1989 it saw the rise of the movement known as the Yaroslavl Popular Front: Movement for Perestroika. Its members advocated for social justice and the expansion of civil liberties.
Modern-day Yaroslavl is a city whose residents are involuntarily drawn into the capital's impulses and trends. Building their lives 270 kilometres from Moscow, residents of Yaroslavl frequently go to the capital city on the weekends. Some people even work there, earning a Moscow salary and taking advantage of quality infrastructure. At the same time, people don’t understand why the situation is worse in their native city, which is just a little over three hours from Moscow by commuter train.
In 2013, after Yevgeny Urlashov was arrested, another prominent opposition politician appeared in the city. His name was Boris Nemtsov. In September of that year, he got elected to the Yaroslavl Regional Duma, where he started working on anti-corruption investigations.
In the regions, politicians from out of town—usually, governors appointed by Moscow—are often called Varangians [the Viking conquerors and traders who settled in present-day Belarus, Russia and Ukraine from the eighth to ninth centuries].
This episode is typical of the Yaroslavl Region. That’s because the region has a history of opposition. The region saw one of the biggest revolts against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War, and in 1989 it saw the rise of the movement known as the Yaroslavl Popular Front: Movement for Perestroika. Its members advocated for social justice and the expansion of civil liberties.
Modern-day Yaroslavl is a city whose residents are involuntarily drawn into the capital's impulses and trends. Building their lives 270 kilometres from Moscow, residents of Yaroslavl frequently go to the capital city on the weekends. Some people even work there, earning a Moscow salary and taking advantage of quality infrastructure. At the same time, people don’t understand why the situation is worse in their native city, which is just a little over three hours from Moscow by commuter train.
In 2013, after Yevgeny Urlashov was arrested, another prominent opposition politician appeared in the city. His name was Boris Nemtsov. In September of that year, he got elected to the Yaroslavl Regional Duma, where he started working on anti-corruption investigations.
In the regions, politicians from out of town—usually, governors appointed by Moscow—are often called Varangians [the Viking conquerors and traders who settled in present-day Belarus, Russia and Ukraine from the eighth to ninth centuries].
Boris Nemtsov and the Varangian trend: how out-of-town politicians can change a region
Kynev is of the opinion that Varangian politicians aren’t always bad. For example, often such people don’t intend to stuff their own pockets over such a short period of time. A Varangian comes to the region to climb the career ladder, so he will try not to overly indulge himself.
“The drawback of Varangians is that they often aren’t motivated to develop the area,” Kynev continued. “It’s just that in any complex situation, the Varangian will always think about how it's easiest to give an account of himself. He won’t think about how to develop the region or what will be there in 10 or 20 years because he and his children won’t live there.
And, if there’s a crisis in the region, the Varangian governor won’t be able to resolve the conflict because he doesn’t have strong personal connections,” the political analyst says. So, such a governor won’t be able to do much in a crisis because he’s a nobody to the local community.
“The drawback of Varangians is that they often aren’t motivated to develop the area,” Kynev continued. “It’s just that in any complex situation, the Varangian will always think about how it's easiest to give an account of himself. He won’t think about how to develop the region or what will be there in 10 or 20 years because he and his children won’t live there.
And, if there’s a crisis in the region, the Varangian governor won’t be able to resolve the conflict because he doesn’t have strong personal connections,” the political analyst says. So, such a governor won’t be able to do much in a crisis because he’s a nobody to the local community.
“A Varangian is an appointed manager, a person unconnected to the area. He is a careerist. He doesn’t plan to spend a long time here. His task is to stay in the region without problems, in other words, not to mess up his career so he can move up,” political analyst Alexander Kynev explains.
“It’s very easy for an out-of-town politician to be called a ‘Varangian’ when society is displeased with them,” says political consultant Mikhail Krasulin. “No one would think of calling a politician a Varangian when the electorate likes them.” Nemtsov wasn’t from Yaroslavl, but he was actively involved in local life. He also consciously kept himself within arm's reach of Yaroslavl residents, by doing everything from regularly walking and talking to passersby to responsibly immersing himself in the local agenda.
Today, 49 of Russia’s 85 governors are Varangians, not counting the four annexed regions of Ukraine. Most of them bring a team along with them to their new position. In other words, the deputies and heads of ministries may also not be locals.
The centralised system helps the Kremlin build maximum controllability and accountability while eliminating any independence. This is easy to achieve when regional heads, who report to Moscow, create their own teams to manage the region; the teams are comprised of Moscow bureaucrats.
Former Yaroslavl Regional Governor Dmitry Mironov, who headed the region by Vladimir Putin’s edict, made Dmitry Stepanenko chairman of the Yaroslavl Regional Government. And he made Alexei Konstantinov chairman of the Yaroslavl Regional Duma. They all previously served in the Federal Protective Service and are graduates of the same military institute.
“It happened that the region was in the hands of people from the same corporation,” Mikhail Krasulin says. “This is advantageous for the Kremlin. Its orders make it to the regions quickly and unaltered. This can be achieved by placing known and manageable people in those positions.”
The centralised system helps the Kremlin build maximum controllability and accountability while eliminating any independence. This is easy to achieve when regional heads, who report to Moscow, create their own teams to manage the region; the teams are comprised of Moscow bureaucrats.
Former Yaroslavl Regional Governor Dmitry Mironov, who headed the region by Vladimir Putin’s edict, made Dmitry Stepanenko chairman of the Yaroslavl Regional Government. And he made Alexei Konstantinov chairman of the Yaroslavl Regional Duma. They all previously served in the Federal Protective Service and are graduates of the same military institute.
“It happened that the region was in the hands of people from the same corporation,” Mikhail Krasulin says. “This is advantageous for the Kremlin. Its orders make it to the regions quickly and unaltered. This can be achieved by placing known and manageable people in those positions.”
Once it reinstated direct elections of governors, the Kremlin faced a serious task: how could it select and offer its appointed candidate to the people? The authorities found a solution in 2017, creating the School of Governors at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). Since then, 305 people have completed the program. Forty-nine of them became governors and acting heads of regions.
The political analyst from the Black Earth region believes that the creation of governors’ schools is one of the key points in making the regions more politically dependent on Moscow. After all, the school likely chooses vetted individuals who simply need training so the Kremlin can then help them win their elections.
The principle for choosing governors from among the school’s graduates isn’t clear, but the experts who spoke to 7х7 believe that the governors’ school does not get rid of lobbying. It’s still important for the representatives of industrial groups and big business that they have their own person in the region who doesn’t interfere with their affairs.
Kynev argues that there is no appointment scheme and each situation is decided on a case-by-case basis. “There is an overall approach,” he says. “A candidate must have a certain set of features. For example, preferably they’ve been involved in Kremlin projects, they have a political bio, recommendations from their colleagues, etc. Everything else, for example, which region they will be sent to, depends on many other factors.”
The person’s own political background, while it may not be a defining factor, is important in “assigning a fiefdom.” Krasulin argues that Yaroslavl Region's current governor, Mikhail Yevraev, was likely placed in that region because he has a pro-democracy reputation, which befits the region.
Mikhail Yevraev is from the Yabloko party and a former employee of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. He was the man who taught Alexei Navalny to navigate the state procurement system and look for elements of corruption in the 2000s.
In April 2023, it was announced that the authorities were launching mayors’ schools, similar to the governors’ school, where they would train municipal government officials. By January 2024, only five cities in Russia still directly elected mayors: Abakan, Khabarovsk, Yakutsk, Anadyr and Ulan-Ude.
As political analysts have observed, the last key milestone in cementing the power vertical was the law on the general principles of organising public power in the Russian Federation, which was adopted after the Constitution was amended in 2020. Now the federal authorities have every right to interfere in the formation of regional administrations. As a result, Moscow approves an administration’s key government officials.
The political analyst from the Black Earth region believes that the creation of governors’ schools is one of the key points in making the regions more politically dependent on Moscow. After all, the school likely chooses vetted individuals who simply need training so the Kremlin can then help them win their elections.
The principle for choosing governors from among the school’s graduates isn’t clear, but the experts who spoke to 7х7 believe that the governors’ school does not get rid of lobbying. It’s still important for the representatives of industrial groups and big business that they have their own person in the region who doesn’t interfere with their affairs.
Kynev argues that there is no appointment scheme and each situation is decided on a case-by-case basis. “There is an overall approach,” he says. “A candidate must have a certain set of features. For example, preferably they’ve been involved in Kremlin projects, they have a political bio, recommendations from their colleagues, etc. Everything else, for example, which region they will be sent to, depends on many other factors.”
The person’s own political background, while it may not be a defining factor, is important in “assigning a fiefdom.” Krasulin argues that Yaroslavl Region's current governor, Mikhail Yevraev, was likely placed in that region because he has a pro-democracy reputation, which befits the region.
Mikhail Yevraev is from the Yabloko party and a former employee of the Federal Antimonopoly Service. He was the man who taught Alexei Navalny to navigate the state procurement system and look for elements of corruption in the 2000s.
In April 2023, it was announced that the authorities were launching mayors’ schools, similar to the governors’ school, where they would train municipal government officials. By January 2024, only five cities in Russia still directly elected mayors: Abakan, Khabarovsk, Yakutsk, Anadyr and Ulan-Ude.
As political analysts have observed, the last key milestone in cementing the power vertical was the law on the general principles of organising public power in the Russian Federation, which was adopted after the Constitution was amended in 2020. Now the federal authorities have every right to interfere in the formation of regional administrations. As a result, Moscow approves an administration’s key government officials.
Governors without power: how they become a region’s head
It used to be said that Moscow could punish rebellious governors by limiting the regions’ funding. But now, in Krasulin’s opinion, there’s no need to exert financial pressure. “Moscow hardly uses it at all because it has its own people everywhere. Everyone understands what needs to be done and how,” he says.
It is still possible to get elected to municipal government despite the increased centralisation. One example is current Tambov mayor Maxim Kosenkov, who represents the Rodina party. In 2005, he was a member of United Russia and head of the city’s administration. But in 2008 Kosenkov was kicked out of the party and stripped of his municipal seat. A criminal case was opened against him for abuse of power and kidnapping. This didn’t prevent him from then running in and winning another election.
“Kostenkov plays by the rules,” the political analyst from the Black Earth region says of the situation. “As with most other regional politicians, the case of heads of municipalities is simple: either you integrate into the system like Kosenkov did, or you leave it like Sardana Avksentyeva (the former mayor of Yakutsk) did.”
However, in such a government system regional politicians can only have influence in terms of the KPI (key performance indicators) set by the Kremlin.
“Dependence on Moscow reduces regional politicians to executors of Moscow's interests. On the one hand, we see that there is hardly any politics as usual now. In the short term maybe we should expect it to diminish even more—in other words, for it to be even more dependent on the centre. But, in the long term centralisation will subside and full-fledged politics will return,” Krasulin argues.
According to Andreichuk, the Kremlin “squeezed” local government because the mayors of big cities, the regional capitals, almost always had the same weight as governors. In a situation where the governor is fictitiously elected but the mayor is elected by the citizens, it’s unavoidable that the mayor will be a stronger figure in the public’s mind.
“The myth that regional politics in Russia is dead is totally baseless,” Andreichuk says. “Go back six months to September [2023]. The authorities in Khakassia were unable to promote their own governor. Yabloko mustered nine percent of the vote in Ekaterinburg’s city council elections and seven percent in Novgorod’s. The authorities are trying to control the big cities, but they can’t fully manage it. There’s a limit to any power vertical. Direct elections for mayor were abolished in Novosibirsk, but the city is very large. There are many different regional groups with their own interests that continue to fight. In general, the more complex and bigger the region is, the more independence it has and the harder it is to destroy that independence.”
It is still possible to get elected to municipal government despite the increased centralisation. One example is current Tambov mayor Maxim Kosenkov, who represents the Rodina party. In 2005, he was a member of United Russia and head of the city’s administration. But in 2008 Kosenkov was kicked out of the party and stripped of his municipal seat. A criminal case was opened against him for abuse of power and kidnapping. This didn’t prevent him from then running in and winning another election.
“Kostenkov plays by the rules,” the political analyst from the Black Earth region says of the situation. “As with most other regional politicians, the case of heads of municipalities is simple: either you integrate into the system like Kosenkov did, or you leave it like Sardana Avksentyeva (the former mayor of Yakutsk) did.”
However, in such a government system regional politicians can only have influence in terms of the KPI (key performance indicators) set by the Kremlin.
“Dependence on Moscow reduces regional politicians to executors of Moscow's interests. On the one hand, we see that there is hardly any politics as usual now. In the short term maybe we should expect it to diminish even more—in other words, for it to be even more dependent on the centre. But, in the long term centralisation will subside and full-fledged politics will return,” Krasulin argues.
According to Andreichuk, the Kremlin “squeezed” local government because the mayors of big cities, the regional capitals, almost always had the same weight as governors. In a situation where the governor is fictitiously elected but the mayor is elected by the citizens, it’s unavoidable that the mayor will be a stronger figure in the public’s mind.
“The myth that regional politics in Russia is dead is totally baseless,” Andreichuk says. “Go back six months to September [2023]. The authorities in Khakassia were unable to promote their own governor. Yabloko mustered nine percent of the vote in Ekaterinburg’s city council elections and seven percent in Novgorod’s. The authorities are trying to control the big cities, but they can’t fully manage it. There’s a limit to any power vertical. Direct elections for mayor were abolished in Novosibirsk, but the city is very large. There are many different regional groups with their own interests that continue to fight. In general, the more complex and bigger the region is, the more independence it has and the harder it is to destroy that independence.”
“Now regional politicians are not only appointed from the Kremlin, but they are also entirely dependent on Moscow financially,” the political analyst from the Black Earth region argues. “The regions first give money to the centre, then they receive it from that same centre, and so it would be more appropriate in this system to call the governors officers in charge of distributing public funds to the region.”
